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ABSTRACT
URL shortening services facilitate the need of exchanging
long URLs using limited space, by creating compact URL
aliases that redirect users to the original URLs when fol-
lowed. Some of these services show advertisements (ads) to
link-clicking users and pay a commission of their advertising
earnings to link-shortening users.
In this paper, we investigate the ecosystem of these in-
creasingly popular ad-based URL shortening services. Even
though traditional URL shortening services have been thor-
oughly investigated in previous research, we argue that, due
to the monetary incentives and the presence of third-party
advertising networks, ad-based URL shortening services and
their users are exposed to more hazards than traditional
shortening services. By analyzing the services themselves,
the advertisers involved, and their users, we uncover a series
of issues that are actively exploited by malicious advertisers
and endanger the users. Moreover, next to documenting the
ongoing abuse, we suggest a series of defense mechanisms
that services and users can adopt to protect themselves.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Security and Protection]: Unauthorized access;
H.3.5 [Online Information Services]: Web-based ser-
vices; K.4.4 [Electronic Commerce]: Security
Keywords
Short URLs; advertising; malware; iframe; HTML5
1. INTRODUCTION
Many of the most popular sites on the modern web rely
heavily on user-generated content. For instance, online so-
cial networks depend on their users for sharing links and
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status updates with their contacts, while news-aggregation
sites expect users to submit stories and rate the content
submitted by other users. At the same time, however, some
services, such as Twitter, have chosen to restrict the ver-
bosity of users by limiting the total number of characters in
the text fields of their generated content.
URL shortening services arose to address the problem of
publishing long URLs when the available space is limited.
A URL shortening service creates compact alias URLs for
longer URLs that, when visited, redirect the user to the
original long URLs. While, initially, URL shortening ser-
vices were used primarily for their shortening functionality,
nowadays users utilize them even when there are no space
limitations, as a way of“beautifying”their links and tracking
user clicks [2]. Unfortunately, attackers found URL short-
ening services equally useful and started shortening links
towards malicious pages. By spreading the generated short
URLs instead of their original ones, attackers could evade
blacklists and filtering systems looking for suspicious pat-
terns in URLs, or simply exploit the fact that users consider
short URLs as a (benign) part of the web ecosystem.
One special type of URL shortening services are ad-based
URL shortening services, like adf.ly. These services, in
addition to shortening long URLs, pay the link-shortening
users a small commission every time a user clicks on their
shortened link. The services generate income by exposing
the visitor of short URLs to advertisements before redirect-
ing them to the final destination. Although some of the
previous work on generic URL shorteners included some ad-
based shorteners in their list of studied services [21], the
ad-based URL shortening services were treated in the ex-
act same way as the rest of the traditional URL shorteners,
ignoring their peculiarities.
In this paper, we argue that (1) the monetary incentive
for link-shortening users and (2) the involvement of third-
party advertising networks expose ad-based URL shortening
services and their users to many more security and privacy
threats than their non-advertising counterparts. To discover
and quantify these threats, we perform a three-pronged anal-
ysis of ad-based URL shortening services.
First, we compile a list of the top ten ad-based URL short-
ening services and analyze their technical characteristics and
architectural choices, focusing on the ones with security and
privacy consequences. We discover that, among others, none
of the services properly isolate the advertising content, mean-
ing that malicious advertisers can escape from their con-
tainers, take control of the page, and redirect the user to
malicious pages of their choice. Second, we study the adver-
tisers that choose ad-based URL shortening services as their
advertising platform. We identify advertisers that perform
drive-by downloads, attempt to trick the user into installing
malware, escape their isolation containers, and expose mi-
nors to inappropriate content. Third, we turn our attention
to the users of these services, separating them into producers
and consumers, i.e., users who create short links and users
who click on them. For producers, we analyze 29,709 short
URLs and discover many abuses, including the chaining of
multiple ad-based URL shortening services to gain multi-
ple commissions from a single click, and luring the user into
clicking on links shortened by ad-based URL shortening ser-
vices, promising them access to attractive content, but fi-
nally not delivering it. To study the consumers, we buy ad-
vertising packages from the two most popular services and
show that more than 10% of all visitors who were exposed
to our ads were running vulnerable and exploitable browsers
and browser plugins. Finally, motivated by the magnitude
of the discovered abuse, we propose a series of pragmatic
defense mechanisms that ad-based URL shortening services
and their users can readily adopt.
In summary, we make the following original contributions:
• We present the first study of ad-based URL shorten-
ing services, highlighting their increased attack surface
over traditional URL shortening services.
• We collect more than 10,000 ads shown to users of
these services and describe the discovered attacks and
abuses.
• We analyze the users of these services and show that,
in principle, cybercriminals could use ad-based URL
shortening services as a platform for drive-by down-
loads.
• We propose the use of modern, existing HTML5 tags
and other mechanisms for strengthening the services
and their users against attacks.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, after a brief overview of traditional URL
shortening services, we describe how ad-based URL shorten-
ing services work and how they differ from traditional ones.
More precisely, we highlight how they relay the user from the
short URL to the final destination URL, and the monetary
incentives that could make their users act differently.
2.1 URL shortening services
The first memorable URL shortening service was TinyURL,
which was launched in 2002. Its success attracted competi-
tors and today, there are hundreds of different URL shorten-
ing services that occasionally offer extra features, as a way
of differentiating themselves from the rest.
As the name of these services suggests, the primary pur-
pose of a URL shortening service is to shorten a long URL.
For instance, the link to the PDF file of the Call for Re-
search Papers of the WWW 2014 conference1 is 74 charac-
1http://www2014.kr/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/
WWW2014_CFP_ResearchTrack.pdf
ters long. When using bit.ly, one of the currently most
popular URL shortening services, to shorten this long URL,
we obtained the link http://bit.ly/1bdXeib which is 21
characters long, i.e., almost four times shorter than the
original link. In almost all cases, creating short URLs can
be achieved either by visiting the websites of the shorten-
ing services and submitting the desired destination URL
through their web interface or, in some cases, programmat-
ically through the use of APIs.
When a user visits a short URL, her browser is automat-
ically redirected to the destination page, usually through
the use of appropriate HTTP status messages (HTTP 301
or 302), or other client-side mechanisms, e.g., JavaScript
or HTML meta tags. At the same time, the URL shorten-
ing service registers the visit and creates aggregate statistics
about the visitors that clicked on each specific short URL,
which are usually made available publicly or just to the cre-
ator of the short link.
2.1.1 Advantages
We highlight the following advantages that URL shortening
services offer.
Length Reduction: Reducing the length of a link is de-
sirable in certain circumstances. In some social media ap-
plications such as Twitter, users have only a limited number
of characters available to type their message. Thus, reduc-
ing the size of a shared link provides users with more space
for the rest of their message. In printed media, such as
a business card, there are physical constraints where short
URLs are favored over longer ones. Additionally, in many
cases, the user has to manually type the URL off of a prod-
uct, or a presentation, into her browser. Requiring the
user to type less characters or using a mnemonic alias, e.g.,
bit.ly/summer2013, means that there are less chances for
typing errors, which could lead to different websites and nav-
igation errors, causing annoyance for the user.
Beautification: It is not uncommon for certain links to
include a large number of parameters with special values and
control characters. Thus, when sharing link such as http://
example.com/~user1/foo/index.php?a=1&b=2&c=3#secA, a
user may choose to use a shortening service to hide the pres-
ence of these parameters from the shared link. Certain ser-
vices, such as Google Maps, have a built-in URL shortening
functionality to ease the creation and sharing of “beautified”
short links.
Analytics: Whenever users share a link, they may want
to inspect whether the users who received the link, actually
visited the page. In many cases, however, the destination
URL is not under the control of the link-sharing user, i.e.,
the user does not have access to web analytics or web-server
logs. In these cases, URL shortening services can be used
to provide a wrapper around the destination URL, which
will record the fact that the user went through the URL
shortening service, and thus provide visitor analytics to the
link-creating user. For instance, bit.ly recently released a
tool that allows users to create, manage, share, and track
bundles of (short) links in a way similar to browser book-
marks.
Centralized control: Some social networking and micro-
blogging sites wrap all user-produced links with their own
Waiting Page Title Example - adshort.to
http://adshort.to/1a2b3c Search
(optional) Ad Banner
<iframe src="http://thirdpartysite.com/adv.html">
</iframe>
Advertised page
Wait...9 seconds
Timed skip button
Figure 1: Typical organization of the “Waiting
Page”, when visiting a link shortened by an ad-based
URL shortening service. Notice the large amount of
space alloted to the ads.
URL shortening service, which basically acts as a proxy.
This allows the service to disable any link at anytime, with-
out the need to hunt down all posts including a specific
link, and without the need to take offline the final destina-
tion. For instance, if a malicious user shares a link towards a
drive-by download site, whenever Twitter detects the threat,
it can simply block one single short URL and stop its users
from visiting the malicious page, regardless of the connec-
tivity status of the actual malicious page.
2.1.2 Disadvantages
Although URL shortening services are immensely popular,
mainly because they are “embedded” in modern online so-
cial networks, they are also the cause of several security-,
privacy-, and availability-related concerns [16, 21]:
Linkrot: Whenever users share URLs pointing to resources
of interest that are outside of their control, e.g., news ar-
ticles, they unconsciously trust the websites hosting these
resources, not to change the content present on those URLs.
For instance, if a user, Alice, shares the link of an image of
an inspiring scenery with her social network friends, she as-
sumes that when, in the future, her friends visit that URL,
the image will still be available, and it will still be the same
inspiring scenery. If, however, Alice used a URL shortening
service and the shortening service ceases to be operational,
her link will rot, i.e., it will no longer lead the visiting user to
the proper destination, regardless if the original image is still
online and available. Moreover, since most URL shortening
services are free of charge, there are no strong guarantees
that they will be available in the future.
Hijacking: Similar to the issue of linkrot, hijacking can
occur if an attacker manages to change the destination of
short URLs and redirect the visiting users to pages under
his control. An example of such a scenario was an attack
against the cli.gs URL shortening service in 2009, where
the attackers compromised the backend servers of the service
and managed to change the destination of 2.2 million short
URLs. As a result, millions of users were redirected to the
attackers’ domains [5].
Obfuscation and Maliciousness: In the list of advan-
tages, we mentioned that users may utilize a URL shorten-
ing service for beautification purposes. Unfortunately, the
same reasoning can be abused by attackers, who use such
services in order to hide the final, malicious destination of
their URLs, or even to pique a user’s interest by crafting a
short URL with a special suffix so as to fit the victim’s pro-
file (e.g., tinyurl.com/freemoviepack). Thus, in the past,
short URLs have been found to lead to phishing pages [4],
pages hosting malicious, drive-by downloads [18], and shock
sites, i.e., sites with content that is offensive and provocative
for the vast majority of users.
2.2 Ad-based URL shortening services
Ad-based URL shortening services are services that use ad-
vertising and referral programs to encourage users to create
and share short links by paying them a small amount of
money for every visit to their short URLs. For the user who
creates the short link, the process is similar to shortening a
link with any other URL shortening service. The key dif-
ference is that the link-creating user must have an account
with the service, if she wants to get paid for the traffic that
she later brings.
2.2.1 Waiting page and redirection
Whenever another user clicks on the link shortened by an
ad-based URL shortening service, she lands on the service’s
“Waiting Page”, where she must first watch an advertisement
for at least a few seconds before she is allowed to proceed to
the final destination of the short URL. Most services follow
the page organization presented in Figure 1, where the top-
part of the page is controlled by the ad-based URL short-
ening service and the bottom one presents the advertised
content inside an iframe. The timed “Continue” button be-
comes active and clickable only after a predetermined num-
ber of seconds. This ensures that the link-following user gets
exposed to the ad before continuing to the landing page.
During this time span, the landing page’s URL is not re-
vealed. Depending on the service, it could be simply obfus-
cated, or loaded asynchronously from the service’s server by
a JavaScript routine. Some services also use the top part of
the page to show additional advertising banners, maximizing
the screen real-estate dedicated to ads.
2.2.2 Advertised page
The iframe displaying the ad to the user is under the full
control of the advertiser. Barring the use of modern HTML5
tags that limit the functionality available to the page inside
an iframe, an advertiser is free to run arbitrary JavaScript
code, Flash, and Java applications, set cookies on the visi-
tor’s browser, and show arbitrary content. Finally, note that
the ads appearing when a user follows a short URL are un-
predictable, and depend on each service’s internal bidding
system as well as the available ads. Thus, there is no guar-
antee that when two users follow the same short URL, that
they will be exposed to same advertisement.
2.2.3 Business model
As is usual for ad-syndicators, ad-based URL shortening ser-
vices make profit through the difference between the com-
Service
Alexa
Ranking
Link
Hijacking
Sequential
URLs
URL
Leaking
adf.ly 83 X X 7
linkbucks.com 260 X 7 7
adfoc.us 1,421 X X X
bc.vc 2,473 X 7 7
ysear.ch 17,571 X X X
coinurl.com 20,831 X X 7
reducelnk.com 79,463 X X 7
ssl.gs 99,099 X 7 7
zpag.es 136,459 X X X
adcrun.ch 263,694 X 7 7
Table 1: List of the ten investigated ad-based URL
shortening services and their discovered shortcom-
ings
mission they pay to their link-creating users, and the rates
they charge the advertisers. For instance, as of October
2013, adf.ly, one of the most popular ad-based URL short-
ening services, charges $5 for 1,000 ad impressions targeted
to users from the US, and offers $3.94 to link-creating users
who deliver 1,000 visitors originating from the US.
2.2.4 Key characteristics
Overall, one can see that ad-based URL shortening services
differ in two important ways from traditional URL short-
ening services. First, they provide a monetary incentive to
link-shortening users, not simply to create short links but to
make sure that they are visited by as many users as possible.
We argue that this business model can motivate an equiva-
lent of click-fraud, where some link-shortening users may try
to automate visits in order to increase their profits. Second,
these services provide advertisers with a privileged position
in a browser, i.e., an iframe, which can potentially be used
to harm the users who visit these shortened links. For in-
stance, whenever attackers desire to spread malware through
a drive-by download strategy, they first need to exploit pop-
ular websites and add malicious code that will divert traffic
towards their browser-exploiting page. In contrast, ad-based
URL shortening services give this power directly to attackers
nearly for free. In the next sections of this paper, we show
how all services are vulnerable to various attacks and demon-
strate that attackers are actively exploiting using them for
attacking link-clicking users.
3. SECURITY AND PRIVACY PROBLEMS
To discover ad-based URL shortening services we searched
for competitors of adf.ly on popular search engines. We
manually examined each discovered website and checked if
it conformed to the definition of ad-based URL shortening
services presented in Section 2.2. We were able to find ten
such services, which we list in Table 1 ordered by their Alexa
ranking. As one can readily observe, almost all services are
in the first quarter of Alexa’s top 1 million websites [1],
which means that millions of users visit them daily.
For each discovered service, we shortened several URLs
which we later visited, recording their workings and certain
architectural choices that could lead to abuse by attackers.
Some of the issues that we discovered, detailed below, are
both novel and specific to ad-based URL shortening services,
while others are generic to URL shortening services.
3.1 Link Hijacking
As mentioned in Section 2.2, ad-based URL shortening ser-
vices place advertisements in an iframe that spans most of
the “Waiting Page” that the user encounters when clicking
on a short link. The use of an iframe sufficiently sepa-
rates the advertiser from the including page, since the ad-
vertising scripts cannot access the DOM of the parent frame
due to the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) [32], a powerful secu-
rity mechanism enforced by all browsers. The SOP, how-
ever, does not stop the attacker from redirecting the entire
page to an arbitrary destination. This can be easily done in
JavaScript by simply setting the top.location variable to
the desired destination URL.
This technique is called “frame-busting” and has been as-
sociated with sites that tried to protect themselves against
clickjacking [27], i.e., an attack based on rendering a victim
page in an invisible iframe overlaying a malicious page, and
convincing the user to interact with the malicious page. Le-
gitimate sites would include (and still do) a simple JavaScript
snippet which would detect the fact that they were “framed”
and escape the iframe, as follows: 
if (top != self)
top.location = self.location; 
In ad-based URL shortening services, however, it is the un-
trusted party that is framed and can perform the exact same
check, escaping the iframe and redirecting the entire tab of
the user’s browser. Thus, an attacker can redirect the vic-
tim from the service’s “Waiting Page”, to browser-exploiting
pages, scams and phishing attacks. Interestingly, attack-
ers can utilize their full power to conduct more sophisti-
cated phishing attacks. For instance, since, by default, a
site rendered in an iframe has full access to JavaScript and
plugins, the attacker can fingerprint the user’s browser [9]
and redirect only specific users to a phishing site, i.e., con-
duct a spear-phishing attack. Additionally, for the sites that
leak the page’s short URL to advertisers (described in Sec-
tion 3.3), an attacker can discover to which site the user will
be redirected once she clicks the shortening service’s time-
activated button, and can thus redirect the user to phishing
pages, specific to each destination site.
Finally, because of the time that the user needs to wait
before she is allowed to proceed to the landing page, ranging
from 5 to 10 seconds for the studied services, it is likely that
the user will switch focus to another tab, thus not witnessing
the redirection to a phishing page. As argued for in the
tabnabbing attack [8, 25], this loss of focus can increase the
chances that the user will later believe that the phishing page
is a legitimate one, and proceed to disclose her credentials.
Even though modern browsers include iframe-restricting
mechanisms that allow a parent page to severely restrict the
power of an attacker, unfortunately, none of the investigated
services are currently utilizing them — see Table 1 — thus
all are prone to the aforementioned attacks. In Section 6, we
describe these mechanisms in detail and show how ad-based
URL shortening services could adopt them.
3.2 Sequential URLs
In the first large-scale study of traditional URL shortening
services, Antoniades et al. [2] exploited the fact that pop-
ular URL shortening services were creating short URLs in
a sequential, and thus predictable way, in order to gather
short URLs for their experiments. In a similar manner, six
out of the ten studied ad-based URL shortening services also
generate sequential short URLs.
The danger posed by sequential short URLs is the fact
that they can be discovered by others, without being explic-
itly handed a link. This becomes particularly problematic
when these short URLs point to non-public resources, such
as URLs including hidden directories of a website, or in-
cluding sensitive parameters, such as a Document Identifier
for Google Docs, or file identifiers used by one-click-hosting
services [22].
For ad-based URL shortening services, we argue that be-
cause of the commission that link-shortening users get for
clicks on their links, they will prefer to link and distribute
content that will appeal to many users, rather than private
content that is relevant to only a small number of users. In
principle, however, the risk that some users will choose these
services for sharing private URLs, not knowing that their
content can be discovered by other users, is still present.
3.3 Short URL Leaking
The Referer header is an HTTP header that is automatically
added by the browser to outgoing requests, and identifies
the URL of the resource from which the current request
originated.
In the context of ad-based URL shortening services, a ser-
vice, if not appropriately designed, can leak the visited short
URLs to the advertisers appearing in the service’s “Wait-
ing Page”, through the browser’s Referer header. Three of
the ten investigated services are leaking their short URLs
to advertisers, leading to security, as well as, privacy con-
sequences for their users. In terms of security, the leaked
URL can be combined with the advertiser’s ability to escape
their iframe, and lead, as described earlier, to sophisticated
phishing attacks. In terms of privacy, the advertiser gains
knowledge about a user’s browsing habits that he did not
previously possess. That is, an advertiser who desires to
build a browsing profile of users, can use the leaked short
URL, resolve it to its real long URL, and include that ex-
panded URL in a database of that specific user. Thus, over-
time, advertisers can build lengthy browsing profiles of the
users of ad-based URL shortening services, even if the desti-
nation sites do not directly provide them with visitor data.
Note that most traditional URL shortening services are not
prone to this problem, because, as described in Section 2.1,
the user is immediately redirected to the destination URL,
without the use of a “Waiting Page” that can host third-
party content.
4. ADVERTISEMENTS
Ads are the lifeblood of ad-based URL shortening services.
In this section, we investigate the ads shown to users of
these services, looking for possible abuses by the advertisers
of each service.
4.1 Drive-by download advertisements
Drive-by download attacks [24, 31] are a big threat in the
modern web. In a drive-by download attack, miscreants try
to exploit a vulnerability in the browser of the victim, or
in one of its plugins and, if successful, instruct the victim’s
machine to download and install malicious software.
Intuitively, web advertisements are the perfect way for at-
tackers to perform drive-by download attacks: the malicious
Ad-exchange Shorteners #Malicious URLs
popads.net adf.ly, adfoc.us, bc.vc 377
adcash.com adf.ly 231
adsmarket.com adf.ly, bc.vc 188
directrev.com adf.ly 146
adbrite.com adf.ly, adfoc.us 125
clicksor.com adf.ly 72
yieldads.com adf.ly 60
doubleclick.net adf.ly, adfoc.us 31
adnxs.com adf.ly 27
z5x.net adf.ly, adfoc.us 17
Table 2: Top 10 ad-exchanges serving drive-by
download exploits, as logged by Wepawet, showing
that many ad-exchanges serve multiple shorteners.
The number of malicious URLs indicates the unique
number of ad-based short URLs that pointed to a
malicious web page served by that ad-exchange.
advertisement will be displayed on many different websites,
and a multitude of victims visiting such websites will be
infected. For these reasons, attackers are using advertise-
ments to perform their attacks, and researchers have devel-
oped techniques to detect and block such malicious adver-
tisements [17, 29].
To investigate to what extent cybercriminals use the ad-
vertisements displayed by ad-based URL shorteners for their
drive-by download attacks, we analyzed the historical data
from the Wepawet service [7]. Wepawet visits suspicious
web pages in an emulated browser, and looks for signs of
maliciousness that are typical of a drive-by download.
We analyzed the logs for Wepawet for the period between
January 1, 2013 and July 31, 2013. In total, Wepawet logged
892 malicious web pages that were accessed by clicking on
an ad-based short URL. Malicious adf.ly links were respon-
sible for 80.7% of the total URLs, while the remaining per-
centage was shared among the other services. Note that
Wepawet is a completely passive tool. It records HTTP re-
quests as they happen, and analyzes the JavaScript code
of the pages it visits, but it never clicks on links. Since
Wepawet does not click on links, the “Continue” button of
a service’s “Waiting Page” is not clicked, and thus the emu-
lated browser never reaches the destination URL. Therefore,
the 892 detected URLs were malicious because of their ads,
and not because of the final destination URL.
Note that the number of malicious short URLs detected
by Wepawet in this case is a lower bound: in fact, Wepawet
can detect that a particular advertisement is malicious only
when that advertisement is displayed among the many pos-
sible ones. In addition, drive-by downloads are only one
among many types of malicious web pages. As discussed
later in this section, some advertisements displayed by ad-
based URL shorteners often ask the user to install a binary,
by leveraging social engineering techniques similar to fake
antivirus scams [28]. Since, however, these attacks involve
actions by the user, they are not detected by Wepawet.
We then wanted to understand which ad-exchange services
provided the malicious advertisements detected by Wepawet.
Note that once Wepawet marks a URL as malicious, it does
not provide information about which particular page along
the chain of redirection served the malicious content. In
addition, ad-exchanges typically undergo a complex bidding
system to display the most suitable advertisement for their
EU Monitor US Monitor
#Ad #Malicious % #Adult % #Ad #Malicious % #Adult %
Service Clusters clusters Impressions clusters Impressions Clusters clusters Impressions clusters Impressions
adf.ly 76 3 4.61% 1 0.99% 139 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
linkbucks.com 43 1 89.1% 2 0.45% 51 3 90.1% 0 0.00%
adfoc.us 114 6 36.5% 0 0.00% 142 23 52.1% 0 0.00%
bc.vc 25 10 95.1% 0 0.00% 48 2 75.3% 0 0.00%
ysear.ch 117 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 135 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
coinurl.lcom 248 1 0.18% 0 0.00% 232 2 1.08% 0 0.00%
reducelnk.com 329 0 0.00% 2 34.2% 300 19 45.0% 4 15.8%
ssl.gs 1 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
zpag.es 107 0 0.00% 2 3.5% 149 3 7.16% 0 0.00%
adcrun.ch 76 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 93 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Table 3: Advertising abuses discovered for each examined service, separated by the geographical location of
our monitors
users, and often times they ask other peered advertisement
networks to display the advertisement for them [29]. In this
case, Wepawet logged a sequence of HTTP redirections that
spans multiple ad-exchanges. For simplicity, we counted an
ad-exchange that appeared at any point of the redirection
chain as serving a malicious URL. The ad-exchange could be
a rogue one that is purposefully sending malicious advertise-
ments, or a legitimate one that failed to detect a particular
advertisement as malicious. A summary of our results is
presented in Table 2, showing that some of the detected ad-
exchanges served ads to multiple ad-based URL shorteners,
while others were specific to adf.ly.
4.2 Malicious and Adult advertisements
In this section, we investigate the presence and workings
of malicious and adult advertisements appearing in each of
the studied ad-based URL shortening services. Note that,
in this case, we denote malicious ads as those that attempt
to convince the user to perform some action that will lead
to the installation of malware and a possible exfiltration of
private data. Thus, these ads are malicious but distinctly
different than drive-by downloads. Adult ads are ads that
are obviously intended for an adult audience, with varying
degrees of nudity. We chose to group malicious and adult
ads together because previous research has shown that adult
content is tied to increased maliciousness [34], i.e., attackers
take advantage of the popularity of adult content as a way
of luring users to malicious pages and then exploiting their
machines, or exfiltrating their private data.
To gather advertisements, we designed a scraper based on
PhantomJS [12], a headless and scriptable browser, and re-
solved short URLs, once every hour, for each of the ten
studied services, for a period of six weeks, starting on Au-
gust 1, 2013. To account for ads specific to a user’s geo-
graphical location, we deployed two such monitors, one in
a European country and one in the US. For every visited
short URL, our scraper took a screenshot of the ad showing
in each service’s “Waiting Page”. We opted for screenshots
since the advertisers in the iframe were using other iframe
tags of varying and unpredictable nesting, making the au-
tomated URL extraction of the actual advertising-page, an
error-prone approach. Conversely, by capturing an image of
the ad, we are capturing the essence of what a user would
have seen. At the end of our six-week collecting period, we
had collected the screenshots of approximately 1,000 ads for
each service. These screenshots contained a large variety of
ads with different image size, colors, product displays, and
model pictures.
To automatically cluster the screenshots of the ads for
each service, we made use of perceptual hashing [19]. Given
an image, perceptual hashing generates a distinct (but not
unique) hash value that can be used to compare the im-
age with others. The key advantage of using perceptual
hashing, is its hash-generating speed and robustness against
image scaling, aspect-ratio variation, and small changes in
color, such as those due to contrast and brightness. We use
the Hamming distance between hash-values as our distance
metric. If the distance between two hashes is less than an
empirically calculated threshold, we cluster the screenshots
together. Overall using perceptual hashing, we achieve a
precision of 99.7% and recall of 97.4% (compared against
manually generated ground-truth). Once screenshots were
clustered, we manually examined each cluster for malicious
and adult ads.
Table 3 shows the results of our clustering and labelling,
separated by monitor location. The first thing one can no-
tice is that, for both monitors, five or more services exposed
users to at least one malicious ad while the user was on
the services’ “Waiting Page”. At the same time, however,
it is evident that some services are much more targeted
by malicious advertisers than others. For instance, in the
case of linkbucks.com, malicious ads were shown to users
from Europe, 89.1% of the time. The majority of mali-
cious ads, across both monitors, were trying to convince
the user to install software by either pretending that her
browser or plugins are out of date, or that the user needed
a special type of media player (plugin or stand-alone) to
stream media content. Figure 2 shows an example of such
an ad that warns users about their supposedly out-of-date
Adobe Flash plugin. Sampled executables from these ads
were downloaded and submitted to VirusTotal, where they
were detected, by at least one anti-virus engine, as mali-
cious software. Additionally, in Table 3, one can see a trend
of showing more malicious ads to visitors from the US (with
the exception of the bc.vc service) and more adult ads to
users from Europe. One reasonable explanation for this phe-
nomenon is that, according to research in pay-per install
services, attackers are paid significantly more money for in-
fecting machines in the US in comparison with machines
anywhere else in the world [3, 20]. As such, when it comes
to users from Europe, it may be more lucrative for malicious
advertisers, to show them adult ads, subscribe them to ex-
Figure 2: One of the malicious ads found in the
reducelnk.com service.
pensive services, and sell their registration data, instead of
trying to infect them with malware. It is also worthwhile
to note that the adult ads were unrelated to the destination
page of the short URL. For instance, for one specific service,
we unfortunately witnessed adult ads when following short
URLs pointing to domains such as disney.com, showing the
danger of exposing minors to adult content.
4.3 Link Hijacking
In Section 3, we described the problem of link hijacking in
the context of ad-based URL shortening services. While
manually labelling ad clusters, as explained earlier, we found
ads displayed through four different services that had es-
caped their iframe and had redirected the entire page to
a new destination of their choice. These could be visually
detected, by the lack of a “Waiting-Page”-specific banner,
as described in Section 2.2. By manually analyzing these
redirections, we realized that while some of them were acci-
dental, the rest were intended.
For the accidental redirections, we saw that one specific
legitimate website was escaping its iframe and redirecting
the entire page to its proper domain. By investigating their
code, we located frame-busting JavaScript, as described in
Section 3.1, which was meant to protect the page from un-
wanted framing. The same code, triggered the redirection
when the page was shown, as an ad, by an ad-based URL
shortening service, where there was obviously no intention
to attack it.
The rest of the iframe escapes were intended redirections,
malicious in nature. The user was redirected to malicious
pages claiming to offer the Google Chrome browser, the lat-
est version of Java, and even the waiting pages of other ad-
based URL shortening services, where the user would have
to wait again and then be redirected to a destination, dif-
ferent than the one of the original short URL.
4.4 Summary of findings
Overall, it is evident that malicious advertisers are exploit-
ing ad-based URL shortening services, using them to launch
drive-by downloads, convince users to install malicious soft-
ware, or redirect them to an altogether different page. This
shows that even when the users creating short links are well-
meaning individuals, who try to earn some income from
other users clicking on their links, they are unintentionally
exposing link-clicking users to a wide range of unpredictable
attackers. At the same time, some services seem to be much
better than others, in keeping malicious and adult content
away from their users.
5. USERS OF THESE SERVICES
In this section, we turn our attention to the users of ad-based
URL shortening services. We first investigate the consumers
of short links, i.e., the users who click on URLs shortened
by these services, and then the producers, i.e., the people
who choose these services to shorten their links.
5.1 Consumers
To find out more about the consumers of URLs shortened by
ad-based URL shortening services, we purchased advertising
impressions from the two top ranking shorteners, i.e., adf.
ly and linkbucks.com. More specifically, for adf.ly, we
purchased 1,000 impressions to visitors from the US and
5,000 impressions to world-wide traffic. For linkbucks.com,
we purchased 2,000 impressions to visitors from the UK. At
the time of this writing, adf.ly charges $5 for 1,000 visitors
from the US, while only $1 for 1,000 visitors from all around
the world. linkbucks.com uses a bidding system, where we
bid $3.3 for every 1,000 UK visitors.
Given the maliciousness that we identified in previous sec-
tions of the paper, we were mostly interested in how lucrative
it would be for an attacker, to use ad-based URL shorten-
ing services as a way of infecting machines. To that extent,
every time our ad was rendered by a user, we obtained a par-
tial fingerprint of her browsing environment [9, 23], in terms
of the user’s IP address, the browser’s User Agent and the
list of plugins, through a small snippet of JavaScript. We
also sent to the user a session cookie from our advertising
domain, so that we could remove multiple entries from the
same user, at the later processing stage. From a total of
8,000 impressions, we only collected 4,300 fingerprints. The
worldwide traffic from adf.ly (the cheapest available traf-
fic) was the main responsible for this effect, sending us only
28.6% of the expected number of fingerprints. We believe
that this is mainly due to many crawlers, scrapers and bots
with limited, or altogether missing, JavaScript support, that
consumed the majority of our advertising impressions. This
result, in itself, points to the possibly limited usefulness of
cheap world-wide traffic as a source of human impressions.
By analyzing the 4,300 fingerprints that we received, and
removing duplicate entries, we discovered that approximately
50% of the users were running some sort of outdated soft-
ware, in terms of browsing client, version of Adobe Flash,
or version of Java. To get a realistic approximation of the
percentage of exploitable software, we compared the out-
dated software versions with exploits in 50 modern exploit
kits listed in [10]. This list of exploits is compiled by known
security analysts and research groups, by tracking various
exploit packs over a period of more than 3 years. We dis-
covered that, according to the exploits used by the exploit
kit authors, approximately 25% of the users running out-
dated software were vulnerable to at least one exploit. For
example, from 978 US users of adf.ly for whom we received
Reputation Safe for children Trustworthy
%Referrers %Landing %Referrers %Landing
Excellent 30.78 42.09 32.78 56.21
Good 9.12 26.45 15.02 18.80
Poor 3.79 14.04 0.58 13.47
Unsatisfying 5.02 6.50 4.12 2.69
Very Poor 51.29 10.92 47.50 8.82
Table 4: A non-negligible amount of the ad-based
short URLs observed were found on low-reputation
referrers, and were actively pointing to inappropri-
ate content.
their fingerprints, 424 had outdated software and 110 of
those were vulnerable to exploits used by exploit kits. More
specifically, the 110 users were vulnerable from one to five
different vulnerabilities, exploitable by nine different exploit
kits, including the popular BlackHole and CoolExploit [10].
Using estimates of pay-per-install services [3, 20], an at-
tacker can sell 1,000 malware installations on machines in
the US for $180, while paying only $50 for advertising, to
receive the needed number of visitors. While an attacker has
more costs than just advertising, e.g, the cost of acquiring
an exploit kit, and the cost of early detection by an ad-based
URL shortening service, the large gap between the produc-
tion cost of 1,000 infections and the selling price of these
infections, is a sign that such a scheme would be profitable.
5.2 Producers
To find out more about the producers of the ad-based URL
shortening ecosystem, i.e., the link-shortening users, we an-
alyzed 29,709 distinct short URLs. We obtained this dataset
by querying Bing’s Search API for the ‘http://<service>/*’
string (for each of the top ten services) on a daily basis be-
tween Aug 28 and Sep 20, 2013. We then visited the referrers
returned by Bing, i.e., the pages hosting short links, with
a PhantomJS scraper similar to the one described in Sec-
tion 4.2, and searched the computed DOM for short URLs
of the studied services. We found short URLs on 3,619 dis-
tinct referrers, which means about 8 to 10 short URLs per
page, on average. Last, we resolved each of the collected
short URLs with another scraper, obtaining 19,563 distinct
landing pages, making an aliasing ratio of about 1.52 dis-
tinct short URLs per distinct landing URL. The aliasing
phenomenon was mentioned in [16, 18] as one of the typical
characteristics of malicious short URLs.
In order to understand where the ad-based short URLs
are typically found, and where they typically point to, we
categorized the referring and landing URLs in our dataset
using the WOT Reputation API2 which provided a security-
oriented website categorization. When WOT was not able
to provide a precise categorization (e.g., “Other” or “Un-
known”), we used Trendmicro’s Site Safety Center service.3
5.2.1 Referrer pages
Table 4 shows that the majority of the short URLs in our
measurement were found on low-reputation referrers, i.e.,
pages labeled as “Poor”, “Unsatisfying”, and “Very Poor”.
By examining the distribution of the content categories we
found that websites belonging to the “Blogs / Web Com-
2http://www.mywot.com/wiki/API
3http://global.sitesafety.trendmicro.com/
munications” category, are the most responsible for host-
ing links shortened by ad-based URL shortening services
(26.19%).
We analyzed the top domains, i.e., the domains belonging
to Blogspot, Tumblr, WordPress, and found out that these
referrers are actually aggregators of short URLs that attract
visitors (and search engines) by promoting free versions of
otherwise paid content (e.g., software, music, videos). In-
deed, a simple analysis of the URL strings revealed that
the most popular words were “download”, “premium” and
“rip”. For instance, we discovered the practice of creating at-
tractive user-generated content, e.g., YouTube videos, that
include ad-based short URLs in the video description and
comments, which promise free goods if followed.
Manual inspection of a sample of the referrers categorized
as “Blogs / Web Communications” revealed that the con-
tained short URLs actually bring the users into an end-
less circle of ad pages, pop-ups, and other ad-based short
URLs. We calculated that 25.83% of the collected short
URLs pointed back within the ad-based short URL ecosys-
tem. By performing the same calculation for 1 million short
URLs belonging to traditional shortening services, as pro-
vided to us by Maggi et al. [18], we discovered that there, the
practice of chaining multiple services was much less popular,
with only 6.37% of the short links pointing to other short-
ening services. This large difference can be explained by the
fact that the chaining of multiple ad-based URL shorten-
ing services increases the prospects of multiple commissions
for the link-shortening users. Contrastingly, chaining multi-
ple traditional URL shortening services merely increases the
chances of linkrot, with the only plausible benefit being the
obfuscation of the original referring page.
5.2.2 Landing pages
Even though many short URLs were discovered in the refer-
rer pages of low reputation sites, Table 4 shows that the
majority of links point to high-reputation landing pages.
We analyzed the top categories of the landing pages and
found out that they were “Good Site” (59.44%), “Other”
(13.58%), “Computers/Internet” (13.46%). The top sites are
file-hosting services (e.g., fileserve.com and mediafire.
com), Facebook apps, and tny.cz (an ad-based pastebin ser-
vice, often abused to host illegally-obtained content, such
as usernames and passwords). These results reveal that
ad-based URL shortening services are used as a “wrapper”
around other services, in order for the poster of, legal and il-
legal, attractive content to receive a monetary compensation
for their content, even if the final service does not directly
provide a referral program.
Interestingly, only 9.95% of the landing pages within file-
hosting domains were actually serving content, making the
content promoted in the referring page unreachable. This
confirms our intuition that ad-based short URLs are ac-
tively promoted with appealing content with the purpose
of driving traffic through them, yet without actually provid-
ing the promised content to link-following users. Regarding
the links to Facebook apps, we found that they are instances
of the so-called “cheats”, which are specially-crafted URLs
that allow, for example, to bypass a level or gain free goods
in Facebook games.
5.3 Summary of findings
In this section, we showed that a significant fraction of the
consumers of ad-based short URLs are vulnerable to exploits
due to outdated client software, and estimated that the us-
age of ad-based short URLs as a platform for the distribution
of malware would be a profitable scheme.
Regarding the producers, in addition to the historical anal-
ysis in Section 4.1, our results confirmed that ad-based short
URLs are abused, arguably more than non-ad-based short
URLs, due to the formers’ monetary incentives. The vast
majority of referring pages are used to attract visitors and
lure them into clicking on ad-based short URLs. Although
the amount of low-reputation landing pages may seem low
(10.92% and 8.82%), our results show that that the WOT
classification is actually a very conservative estimate, and
that, overall, ad-based shortening services are abused by the
producers of short links.
6. DEFENSES
Given the dangers due to rogue advertisers presented in Sec-
tion 4, in this section, we provide an overview of methods
and techniques that ad-based URL shortening services and
their users, can use to defend against the aforementioned
attacks and abuses.
6.1 Link hijacking
In Section 3 we demonstrated how all investigated services
are vulnerable to short URL hijacking, through the redi-
rection of the parent window, initialized by the advertiser-
controlled iframe. While this “write-access” of the parent
window’s location property is the current default behavior
of browsers, the iframe markup of HTML5 supports cer-
tain security-enhancing attributes which allow the parent
window to modify this behavior.
More specifically, HTML5 specifies a “sandbox” attribute
that can be added as part of an iframe [33], e.g., 
<iframe sandbox src="http ://www.untrustedads.com">
</iframe > 
The “sandbox” attribute subjects the loaded page to mul-
tiple severe restrictions, including the following:
• Disabling of JavaScript
• Non-loading of plugins
• Disabling the iframe’s ability to navigate its parent
window
• Disabling the submission of forms
• Disabling pop-ups
• Unique iframe-specific origin, regardless of the domain
where the content is loaded from
Each of these restrictions can be lifted by the parent page,
through explicit white-listing, specified in the sandbox at-
tribute of the iframe. While some of these restrictions, like
the disabling of JavaScript, may be too strong for much of
the advertised content, there are others that should always
be there, such as the disabling of the parent navigation,
which solves the problem of link hijacking.
One possible way of taking full advantage of this sandbox-
ing technology, is for ad-based URL shortening services to
map these iframe restrictions to variable advertising rates,
where the rates increase together with the risk. For instance,
an advertiser who simply wants to display some static con-
tent will happily agree to a fully sandboxed iframe, es-
pecially if it means a reduction of his advertising rates.
Moreover, the resources that the companies use to detect
abuse, like anti-malware and anti-phishing scanners, can
then be safely migrated to increase the thoroughness and
frequency of content-checking for advertisers who require
more functionality. In some cases, it may even be prudent
to charge more for allowing very risky functionality, like en-
abling the loading of plugins whose vulnerabilities are com-
monly abused by exploit authors to install malware on the
machines of users.
From the point of view of the users, browser extensions
such as AdBlocker and NoScript, could also be used to limit
the danger of these services. Note, however, that since the
services’ profitability depends on the display of ads, usage
of such tools may be against the services’ terms of use.
6.2 Short URL Leaking
The leakage of a short URL through the Referer header, as
explained in Section 3, can lead to various security and pri-
vacy issues. This problem is unfortunately common among
services which transfer sensitive parameters in their URLs,
such as session identifiers, file identifiers, or data resulting
from a user-filled form submitted using the GET, instead of
the POST, method [15].
Ad-based URL shortening services can solve the problem
of referrer leakage in various ways. The services that are
currently not vulnerable to this attack use an indirect redi-
rection within the service itself. More specifically, instead of
setting the source of the advertising iframe directly to the
URL of a third-party advertiser or advertising network, they
set it to a generic page, internal to the service. This page
will, in turn, request the advertising URL and thus reveal,
through the Referer header, the URL of the generic page,
rather than the URL containing the short-link identifier.
Another, more generic, approach would be to change the
architecture of the page, so that instead of passing the id
specific to each short URL through a GET parameter, it
would be passed as a fragment identifier. For instance, a
specific short URL of the adf.ly service could be http:
//adf.ly/#Vtcwh instead of http://adf.ly/Vtcwh. Frag-
ment identifiers are not sent out through the Referer header
(thus eliminating short URL leakage) and can be read and
consumed by the service itself through JavaScript, as pro-
posed by Close [6].
Users of most modern browsers can also protect them-
selves, by disabling the sending of the Referer header, al-
though this may interfere with some CSRF countermeasures
which rely on the presence of this header [35].
6.3 Adult ads
For the issue of minors exposed to ads of adult content, one
solution would be to ban this type of ads altogether, like
adf.ly does, or to display them only when the shortened
URL leads to a destination website that is also of an adult
nature. The ad-based URL shortening service linkbucks.
com follows such an approach, where it requests advertis-
ers to explicitly mark their adult-content ads as “over 18.”
These ads are then only shown in combination with short
URLs which their creators have also marked as “over 18.”
While this classification depends solely on each user, and
thus, as demonstrated in Section 4.2, does not always work,
the service warns that users who misclassify their content
may have their accounts banned and their earnings lost. Ad-
ditionally, lists of adult websites and a scanning of ads for
tell-tale signs of adult content can be used to supplement
the classification process. These two techniques can also,
in principle, be used at the client side by users to stop the
display of adult content.
7. RELATED WORK
Traditional, non-ad-based URL shortening services have been
thoroughly investigated in previous research.
The first study on short URLs was done by Antoniades et
al. [2], who collected approximately 8.5 million distinct short
URLs by periodically crawling for bit.ly URLs on Twitter and
by brute-forcing the key space of ow.ly. Although these ser-
vices are the most popular, part of the statistics analyzed
were actually calculated from the data offered by bit.ly, and
thus may represent a service-centric view of the overall us-
age. Maggi et al. tracked the use of short URLs on the web
by monitoring more than 7,000 real web users for a period
of two years [18] and provided insights on where short URLs
are found, on the type of content that they point to, and on
the security threats associated with them.
Rodrigues et al. [26] analyzed a dataset collected on Twit-
ter between 2006 and 2009. In their work, the authors show
that short URLs accounted for 75% of all URLs posted on
Twitter in 2009, and that TinyURL and ow.ly were the top
services. Chhabra et al. [4] analyzed the number of phishing
scams that were posted on Twitter, and that were hidden
behind short URLs. They discovered that most phishing on
Twitter aims at stealing social network credentials rather
than other services. Klien and Strohmaier in [14], performed
a geographical analysis of the short URLs from the qr.cx ser-
vice. Kandylas et al. [13] show that the quality of the landing
pages pointed by bit.ly URLs extracted from Twitter is ei-
ther very high (popular, reputable pages) or very low (spam
and malicious pages).
Neumann et al. [21] showed that many URL shortening
services that are popular on Twitter have privacy implica-
tions both in terms of information disclosure and security.
Our analysis of ad-based URL shortening services shows that
the studied services still have all the problems of traditional
URL shorteners, as outlined by previous work, as well as
multiple additional issues, specific to them.
Previous work also showed evidence of malicious content
hiding behind short URLs. Stringhini et al. [30] show that
most spam campaigns targeting social networking sites lever-
age short URLs. Gao et al. [11] analyzed the activity of
about 3.5 million users on Facebook, and detected a large
number of malicious posts with embedded short URLs. Our
study of ad-based URL shortening services shows the real
danger of users being exposed to malicious content through
a short URL, even if the original shortened URL was benign.
A number of systems studied the redirection chains that
lead to malicious web pages. WarningBird [16] analyzes the
redirection chains generated by visiting short URLs on Twit-
ter, aggregates URLs that point to the same final page, and
determines if that final page is malicious or not. Similarly,
SpiderWeb looks at the redirection graphs that lead to final
web pages [31]. Unlike WarningBird, SpiderWeb looks at URL
that are posted on any web page, and not only on Twitter.
MadTracer [17] is a system that detects malicious ads by
inspecting the redirection chains that visitors follow. Our
work is complementary, in that it studies the problem of
malicious ads from a different perspective, by investigating
the threats facilitated by ad-based URL shortening services.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the ecosystem of ad-based URL
shortening services from a security and privacy perspective.
Because of certain unique attributes of these services, such
as the monetary incentive for clicks on shortened URLs,
and the involvement of third-party advertising networks, we
showed that these services attract abuse that is not typical
of traditional URL shortening services. We described how
all the investigated services were vulnerable, among others,
to the hijacking of short URLs, and demonstrated that many
are actively exploited in order to infect users with malware
and exfiltrate private data.
Our work highlights the dangers of URLs shortened by this
type of services, not necessarily because of a malicious ser-
vice or malicious link-shortening users, but rather because
of the unpredictable, and often malicious, advertisers. To
diminish this danger, we proposed a series of straightfor-
ward countermeasures, which we hope that ad-based URL
shortening services and their users will consider and adopt.
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